Abstract
Introduction
Debates on spatial planning law in Indonesia are dominated by a state-centric viewpoint. This overriding perspective tends to privilege the state as the most or even only legitimate institution to regulate space through legal instruments, to make planning enforceable in society (Hudallah 2010; Hudallah and Woltjer 2007; Moeliono 2011) . The tendency for state dominance in space regulation seems to follow the 'law and development' approach, in which spatial planning is treated as an important tool to allocate space for development, and in which state law serves as an essential instrument of 'social engineering efforts to modernise Indonesian society from a traditional society into a modern industrialised one' (Moeliono 2011, 20) . As a result, the debate on spatial planning law and regulations is confined to normative discourses framed within the state legal regime (see for example Lisdiyono 2008;  Arya Utama & Sudiarta 2011) .
Such a state-centric approach does not carefully assess and take into account the complex legal and institutional constellation in Indonesia. In fact, the post-Suharto era has emphasised this as a major feature of social and legal life in Indonesia (F. and K.
von Benda-Beckmann 2006; Davidson and Henley 2007) . However, by putting the state legal system at the centre of both analysis and policy agendas, state-centric approaches to spatial planning which utilise different legal orders that coexist in society, often fail to understand the dynamics over the use of space. The state's attempts to standardise and modernise the notion of space in this complex setting through spatial planning law, as discussed below, is possibly challenged by other notions of space, such as those deriving from customary norms and principles of ordering space. In debating spatial planning from a socio-legal perspective, as I will do here, a better understanding of this complex legal and institutional constellation is needed. This is crucial for examining which concepts and normative notions of space, and whose interests, count among a diversity of competing concepts, notions and interests pertaining to space, and what mechanisms are available to pursue interests of various social and political actors.
The concept of legal pluralism, developed primarily in the scientific field of anthropology of law, seems to be the most illuminating approach to understand the socio-legal dimensions of spatial planning controversies in society. The concept is based on a conceptualization and scientific study of law in society that takes as its point of departure 'the theoretical possibility of more than one legal order or mechanism within one socio-political space, based on different sources of ultimate validity and maintained by forms of organization other than the state ' (F. von BendaBeckmann 2002: 37) . This distinguishes it from mainstream approaches to law that tend to focus exclusively on the state and state law. Compared to the latter approaches, it uses a broader definition of 'law', recognizing the existence of a variety of legal phenomena, orders, or systems (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 2002) . Legal pluralism itself is referring to a 'state of affairs' where several normative orders coexist and are superimposed in a given society (Griffiths 1986; Soussa-Santos 1987; Moore 1973) . It also refers to a framework to examine the interactions among those normative orders empirically (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2006; FinchettMaddock 2011) . This paper aims to assess the controversy of spatial planning in Bali by employing legal pluralism to the analysis of the processes leading towards a new standardised spatial planning law. This standardisation imposed by the state is not unproblematic. Conditions of legal pluralism provide possibilities to challenge the state's attempt to standardise spatial governance by channelling its argument, among others, through customary discourses available in a given society. In Bali, the most important one is the adage of desa-kala-patra (place-time-circumstance), which states that social norms should be derived accordingly to respect the uniqueness of law rooted in the customary village.
Legal pluralism is pushed further by James Scott's notion of 'seeing like a state' (1998) . Contained in the legal dimension of 'seeing like a state' and the 'state simplifications' that go with it, is a bias towards the state legal system and an assumption that state law always determines the behavior of people, throughout the territory of the state. Attention to legal pluralism puts into perspective this state bias and neglect of non-state legal and normative systems. Contestation over spatial governance in Bali is not merely about the question of which source of legality should prevail, it also about the standardisation of spatial governance imposed by the state through simplifying complex social dynamics in any given society. In the institutionally complex setting of Indonesia, moreover, state interest is not necessarily monolithic since every tier of government may have different or even competing interests over space. This paper argues that, while the state project to allocate space for development has privileged state law, customary and religious law still play a significant role in Balinese society. These three sources of legality interact in a complex way by informing, advancing or even constraining each other within a specific social, political, and economic context. Where the latter is the case, social actors engaged in a legal controversy such as a land conflict or a conflict about spatial planning, have multiple legal repertoires at their disposal that can be mobilized to influence the outcome of such a conflict. This practice is known as 'forum shopping' (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981) . A failure on the part of government agencies or other planners to consider the complex legal constellation of Balinese society, may lead to a lack of understanding of the processes whereby a law is drafted and enacted, and of the causes of ineffective implementation of the state's spatial planning law. In addition, it might cause the marginalization of specific meanings given to space, interests related to space, and cognitive and normative notions attached to it. This may have important consequences, such as changing forms of access and use of resources for specific groups in society, or clashes between conflicting normative notions of planning.
Decentralisation and Tourism Expansion
The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 brought an era of political reformation. Many governmental structures were decentralised under a wide range of pressures exerted by local elites while the central government retained its authorities in matters of security, religion, fiscal, and international relations. In 1999, the first law on decentralisation was issued (Law No. 22/1999) , which transferred several competencies to the district level. Decentralisation to the district (kabupaten) government level rather than the provincial (provinsi) level was chosen, because there was a perception that decentralization under provincial authority might threaten national integrity (McCarthy and Warren 2009, 5) . However, transfer of power to the districts also considerably decreased central control. Therefore, under the Megawati presidency, the law was revised and replaced by Law No. 32/2004 on regional governance, in which provincial governments were given a role as supervisors of the district governments in exercising their autonomy.
In Bali, the regional autonomy regime has changed the political structures of the province. Bali's eight districts and a municipality are now able to exercise strong authority to manage their own territory. This new control structure has led to district arrogance, driven by local elites (so called 'little kings; raja-raja kecil) 1 , confirming Hadiz's (2010) (Wisnu 2009 ). Windia, a local university professor, argues that due to traffic congestion and the loss of cultural uniqueness of the island, tourism to Bali will continue to decline (Asdhiana 2012 ).
Perhaps the most serious impact of the tourism sector and the real estate industry is experienced by Balinese farmers, the subak irrigation systems, and the island's iconic terraced landscape (see also Lorenzen, this issue). Land and water issues have become central in Bali during the reform era. Since the 1990s productive agricultural land has been converted into tourism infrastructure (resorts, hotels, villas, and golf courses) in favour of a mass tourism-oriented model of development, at a rate of around 1,000 hectares per year (Warren 2009, 198) . The expansion of tourism areas has led to an increase of land taxes which are based on the market value instead of the use value of land. The increase in land taxes is unlikely to be afforded by small, often subsistence, farmers who manage less than a third of a hectare of land.
Tourism in Bali is a water-intensive industry that uses water for pleasure rather than for basic needs. Budarma (2012) calculates that a hotel room in Bali consumes around 400-500 litres water daily. Relying on this modest calculation, since it does not include water consumption for pools and golf courses, tourist accommodation in Bali with 50,873 rooms in 2013 (BPS 2014), mostly located in South Badung, consumed more than 20 million litres daily. This is why Bali is predicted to face a water crisis by 2025, as water is poorly managed and the population is projected to increase to over four million people by then (Cole 2012 (Cole , 1225 . Of some 400 rivers in Bali, 260 have reportedly run dry, and 65 per cent of the water resources from the agricultural regions of Tabanan have been diverted to the tourism industry (Cole 2012 (Cole , 1234 . This leads to water conflicts, including one which occurred in subak Yeh
Gembrong of Penebel, Tabanan against the local water agency (PDAM) that had diverted 65 per cent of the water from their spring to supply tourist sites in South
Badung (Kurnianingsih, n.d) .
Complex Legal and Institutional Setting
Attempts have been made by Balinese both to 'push upward' and to 'push downward' the regional autonomy granted officially by the national law (Ramstedt 2013, 116) .
Pushing upward has been undertaken by proposing reconstruction of regional autonomy at the provincial level rather than at the district level. Important and widely discussed, is the Special Autonomy for Bali proposal submitted to the national government. In the proposal, it is asserted that regional autonomy based on district governments is unsuitable for Bali, since it is a small-island province, and district governments tend to exploit their resources by disregarding the impacts beyond their borders or even across the islands (Pansus Otsus Bali 2007). It is suggested that Bali follow the concept of 'one island, one management', with the provincial government as the central institution. Such a proposal has been treated with suspicion by district and municipal governments, for which the changes would mean reduced control over their territory. This has led to uneasy relationships within the formal governmental structure, between the provincial and district governments.
Regional autonomy has been 'pushed downward' by advancing village autonomy through formal law (Ramstedt 2013 With the implementation of regional autonomy, the customary village (desa pakraman) has an increasingly important role in decision-making on local development (Warren 2007) . Whether a development plan can be implemented, or not, now partly depends on approval by the affected customary village. Customary rules (awig-awig) which are based on the principle of desa-kala-patra (in accordance with place, time and circumstance) may be used by customary leaders to advance or even to constrain capital investment or state intervention within the customary territory.
In addition to the revitalisation of customary law, the regional autonomy regime has also provided an opportunity for the revival of religion-inspired local regulations.
Following the incorporation of Islamic Law by many regional governments across Indonesia, the regional government of Bali, rooted in Balinese-Hindu identity, has also regarded religious rulings as an important source for regional policy-making. In the context of spatial governance, an exemplary case is provided by Bhisama, a religious ruling based on Hindu manuscripts concerning the sphere of temple sanctity.
It was issued by the officially recognised Indonesian Hindu Organisation (Parisadha Hindu Dharma Indonesia; PHDI) in its 1994 Mahasabha (General Assembly) in response to a controversial project near the Tanah Lot temple, one of the holiest temples in Bali. The project was developed by Bali Nirwana Resort (BNR), a company owned by Aburizal Bakrie, a national conglomerate close to President
Soeharto (Warren 1998) . Although it failed to prevent the project, the Bhisama has remained the source of claims utilised by NGO activists, academics, as well as customary villages in rejecting project development within sacred areas.
The incorporation of the Bhisama in the formal legal system is seen as a politics toward 'sacralisation' of Bali. Ramstedt (2013, 118) characterised spatial policies in the province well before the current decentralised era.
The Bhisama is derived from traditional concepts of the sacred sphere of temples. The concepts are apeneleng (sacred spheres ranging from the temple's centre to the point not to be seen by the naked-eye); apenimpug (sacred spheres ranging from the temple's centre to the point that cannot be reached by a stone's throw); and apenyengker (sacred spheres ranging from the temple's centre to a physical border such as an outside wall). Those concepts are relatively ambiguous but for the sake of legal certainty they were standardised and quantified in the Bhisama as follows:
apeneleng is subdivided into apeneleng agung equal to five kilometres, and apeneleng alit equal to two kilometers of sacred radius; and apenimpug is quantified The mass media has played an important role in the intensification of controversies over spatial planning. As noted by Warren (1998; since the case of BNR Tanah Lot in 1993, local media in Bali provide an important source of information that NGO activists or other concerned groups respond to. In the context of spatial planning controversies, however, mass media coverage of spatial planning violations across the island has effectively informed public opinion concerning the future of Bali under regional autonomy. Learning from the experience of the BNR case, the media often used religious idioms like the Bhisama concerning the sanctity of the temple sphere, to influence public opinion and build mass support. Thus, the Bhisama has become popularised as an idiom to express public concern about cultural, environmental and religious integrity.
Responding to media coverage, public protests against these violations were held by NGO activists demanding the government enforce the Provincial Regulation The Bhisama concerning the sanctity of the temple sphere was the subject of widespread debate. While many intellectuals, NGO activists, and religious leaders at the provincial level demanded the adoption of Bhisama and stringent sanctions.
Significantly, incorporation of the Bhisama in the provincial regulation was opposed by Pecatu Customary Village, located in South Badung (Suarna 2008 priorities. An example is the competition between the provincial government with its 'one island one management approach' and the exercise of authority by district governments in the era of decentralisation. In the context of spatial planning policies, the differing interpretation of a local measurement unit implies some concessions to the state's logic of 'legibility', standardisation and simplification (Scott 1998, 11) .
Spatial planning law and regulation is standardised based on a uniform spatial matrix which ignores traditional conceptions of space rooted in at least three distinct features, namely 'human in scale', 'relational' or 'commensurable', and 'tied practically to particular activities' (Scott 1998, 25-27) .
These features are also relevant in Bali. One prominent priest argued in the press that use of 'meter' is alien to Balinese traditional concepts of space measurement (Ananda 2011) which is rather references human facility, for example:
apenimpug (stone's throw) and apeneleng (human vision) for distance or atindakan (one-step) for length. As noted by Scott (1998, 26) , these customary characteristics for measurement are 'situationally, temporally, and geographically bound'. In the context of Bali, these are referred to by the adage desa-kala-patra (according to place, time and circumstance). Ananda (2011) especially the provisions on the Bhisama, the strategic areas, 100-meter coastal setback, and the maximum building height. It was considered that these provisions might compromise rent-seeking practices. In public, however, the alliance rationalised their opposition by arguing that the provincial regulation would undermine regional autonomy centered at the district level.
After the Enactment of the New Planning Regime
Defining, organising and regulating space within a complex legal-institutional setting is far from straightforward policy-making. In fact, it leaves a grey area of legal uncertainty that is potentially used by the powerful elites to cherry-pick provisions that support their interests and to mobilize one legal system at the expense of other 
Conclusion
In this paper I have discussed recent controversies over the development and adaptation of Balinese provincial spatial planning regulations, using a framework that takes into account the existence of plural legal-institutional regimes and repertoires.
The paper shows how a situation where different normative orders interact in a given society provides possibilities for 'forum shopping' and 'idiom shopping'. This can be seen, for example, in how the idiom apeneleng (sacred spheres ranging from the temple's centre to the point not to be seen by the naked-eye) is debated, advanced or By employing legal pluralism as an analytical framework, associated sensitivity toward religious and cultural aspects is causing the debate on spatial governance to be widened. Thus, controversies are far from straightforward as might be assumed in the situation of legal centralism where norms and rules for defining, organising and regulating space derive from and are imposed exclusively by the state. Rather, norms, rules and forms of legal regulation are produced, maintained, contested and negotiated within the complex legal and institutional setting. An analysis that takes into account this legal plurality provides us with a better framework for understanding the processes and controversies related to governing space in a pluralistic society. Such analysis brings into focus the perspective of various (state and non-state) legal regimes and institutions, and how they are utilised, resisted, manipulated and negotiated by social actors to pursue their different or even competing interests over the use of space.
1 This expression refers to the arrogance of the heads of district government empowered by decentralisation policies. Those critical of the political developments used the phrase to express their fear that decentralisation would amount to a reempowerment of regional elites claiming power and authority on the basis of ethnicity, indigeneity, the history of local polities like kingdoms, etc. See for example Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken (2007) .
